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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2011
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KUNR](#) [UNSC](#)
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION: WIDE DIFFERENCES
REMAIN; GA AGREES TO CONSULT ON SPECIFIC "ISSUES" RELATED
TO COUNCIL REFORM

REF: STATE 15781

Classified By: William J. Brencick, Minister Counselor for Political Affairs, for reasons 1.4 b,d.

¶1. (SBU) Summary: The General Assembly's Open Ended Working Group on Security Council expansion and reform, meeting for the first time this year, accepted GA President Khalifa's suggestion to proceed via five separate consultations on "key issues" related to Council reform. Facilitators will begin these consultations during the week of February 19 and will be expected to provide a consolidated report back to the working group by the end of March. While delegations expressed support for Khalifa's proposed way forward, the overall tone of the meeting was less cooperative than recent GA debates on Council expansion and presaged a return to the more acrimonious exchanges that dominated the discussion in ¶2005. Few delegations left the room optimistic that the upcoming cycle of meetings will lead to broader agreement on the substance of expansion among delegations. Most were already focused about what comes next. End Summary.

¶2. (U) The Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security Council expansion and reform met for the first time in the 61st GA Session on Thursday, February 8. GA President Khalifa proposed that the OEWG, which has been in existence since 1993, organize itself around five separate pieces of the Council reform debate. She named five facilitators (one from each of the regional groups) and asked them to begin consultations during the week of February 19. The first meeting on each of the five "key issues" will be an informal meeting of the whole (with all GA members invited). Presumably each of the facilitators will then conduct varying consultations in order to present a consolidated report by the end of March, as requested by Khalifa.

¶3. (U) The five facilitators (and their "issues") are:

- Tunisian PR Hachani: "categories of membership";
- Cypriot PR Mavroyiannis: "the question of the veto";
- Croatian PR Mladineo: "the question of regional representation";
- Chilean PR Munoz: "the size of an enlarged Security Council"; and
- Dutch PR Majoor: "the working methods of the Security Council and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly".

¶4. (C) Delegations that took the floor on Thursday universally approved Khalifa's suggested way forward. The debate, however, quickly returned to restatements of previously held positions on the substance of reform. In particular, Italy and Pakistan seemed taken aback by the fact that the G-4 (India, Japan, Brazil and Germany) had prepared a joint statement, read by Brazil at the beginning of the meeting. Though the G-4 statement did not call for any

particular expansion model, the fact that the four continue their political coordination on Council expansion (and so obviously demonstrated it to the group) generated a heated response from their opponents in Uniting for Consensus (UFC).

15. (SBU) The exchange between the G-4 and UFC delegations did not break new ground. G-4 supporters want a process that moves towards putting proposals to an up-or-down vote by member states. They emphasize the language in the 2005 Summit Outcome Document that calls for expansion of the Security Council and believe the OEWG format, with its emphasis on consensus, is outdated. UFC supporters emphasize the need for "ownership" of the process by the general membership and the need for consensus-based outcome. They oppose deadlines and support the OEWG as a forum to discuss this issue. Where UFC will want to continue the OEWG process through the rest of this year, G-4 supporters will seek to use the March report from the facilitators as a means to shift discussion to specific proposals. UFC delegations see the March deadline as unrealistic for the facilitators, while a number of G-4 countries on Thursday argued that they could be done with their work "in less than four weeks".

16. (U) Panama offered a specific proposal for an "interim" solution. Though the idea of an interim mechanism has been discussed among delegations in New York, the Panamanians laid out the first detailed proposal, including numbers, regional breakdown and terms of membership. In addition, the Panamanians suggested that specific delegations could "earn" a permanent seat through repeated election to a non-permanent seat. The Panamanians proposed adding six non-permanent, re-electable, five-year seats to the Council (for a total size of twenty-one). These six seats would be allocated per the G-4 model: one to Latin America; one to Europe; two to Africa; and two to Asia. Any Member State elected to one of

these seats for four consecutive terms would then occupy that seat permanently (without a veto).

17. (C) After the meeting, the Japanese privately commented to USUN that they were surprised by the lack of African attendance at the session. "Only twenty-four attended, and only one (South Africa) spoke." Working-level Japanese in New York believe that the fundamental differences among Member States will continue and will prevent broad consensus from being reached. "We will have to go to a vote to decide. The process will pick up steam only when a concrete proposal is introduced." In this regard, the Japanese noted that they still hoped for a response from the U.S. on their "Model D" proposal.

18. (SBU) Other highlights from delegations' statements on February 8:

-- Belgium: While status quo is not an option, any solution will need the agreement of the current P5. The old proposals are not viable.

-- South Africa: Support for expansion in both categories. Need to focus on the function and mandate of the OEWG and implementation of the 2005 Summit outcome document.

-- Germany: Need to move to a decision-making process; cannot leave the "dominating role of the P5" unchanged. The current SC is an "old, favorite car" that needs to be retired.

-- Japan: Facilitators process needs to be results oriented; Member States need a new proposal. We are working on new ideas and hope to present them in due course.

-- Netherlands: Need to consider a transitional arrangement; Council needs to be perceived as legitimate, credible and equitable by all Member States.

-- China: OEWG is an effective platform.

-- Italy: Need to work together to "build a car" that all are comfortable in. Need a consensus solution; cannot return to one group against the other.

-- Korea: Need to avoid deadlines and find genuine consensus, which is more important than the question of timing or simply changing the status quo.

-- Argentina: Those who want to change the status quo continue to argue among themselves. Should pursue more non-permanent members to "move legitimacy" from the current permanent members. Our ultimate goal should be no permanent members and no more veto.

-- Pakistan: We tried the "new, flashy car" of the G-4 proposal in 2005 and almost had a crash. The exercise "destroyed much of the scenery along the highway." We did not have a choice in the selection of the current P5, it was imposed on us when we signed the Charter; but we have a choice now and cannot accept creating new permanent members. Need broader representation on the Council as means to address the misuse by the Council of its authorities.

-- Malaysia: We should expand the non-permanent membership now, while we continue to discuss the possibility of adding new permanent members. Need to limit the use of the veto and limit other privileges of the P5, including in the appointment of senior UN officials.

-- Costa Rica: Disappointed that today's opportunity to discuss the process has been set aside simply to repeat previous positions that don't have the necessary support.

-- UK: There has been insufficient progress. Need to enhance the Council's "effectiveness and authority". Support Germany, India, Japan and Brazil for permanent membership and permanent seats for Africa.

-- India: Problem wasn't that the "new, flashy car" crashed in 2005, it was that it never got going. Currently, Security Council decisions are legal, but not legitimate. They are losing their natural authority, if they have not lost it already. Only by changing the balance of power on the Council through the addition of new permanent members will we address the real problems. We also need to address the issue of "accountability" as part of the consultations in the OEWG. Need a process of negotiation to get to a solution.

-- Russia: Need to find consensus through a broad approach. Without reform of the Council, overall reform of the UN will be incomplete. Support OEWG as a forum. Expansion should

enhance effectiveness and representativeness but not at the risk of efficiency. Council should remain "compact". Oppose infringement on the rights of the P5. Also need to revitalize the Military Staff Committee as called for in the Outcome Document.

-- France: Expansion of the Council would make it more effective because implementation requires the participation of all Member States. Support the G-4 proposal and Germany, India, Brazil and Japan for permanent seats.

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